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Buyer Beware: An Exploratory Assessment of 
the Static and Dynamic Effects of the New  
Chilean Food Labeling Model 
 




Chile recently introduced an innovative food warning label system that 
intends to reduce current overweight and obesity levels among the Chilean 
population. This initiative has been generally commended worldwide. 
Chile’s new food labeling system mandates food producers to include a 
warning label that resembles a stop sign when the product exceeds a certain 
level of calories, fat, sodium, and sugar per 100 mg. The idea behind this 
regulation is that by making health risks more salient to eaters with simpli-
fied disclosures, people will change their eating behavior. 
As a consequence of this new law, many product markets show a clear 
change in production recipes so that products can be offered with no (or 
fewer) warning labels. This is the case of Coca-Cola, and many desserts, 
including yogurts, flans, and even ice creams. Surveys report that many con-
sumers—especially those from high-income backgrounds and the elderly—
consider the warning labels when they purchase food and drinks. Yet the 
only econometric study conducted with observational data that analyzed the 
impact of the food warning labels reported ambiguous results (i.e., some 
products despite the labels increased their demand, while others showed 
lower sales).  
People who commend the Chilean food labeling model tend to assume 
that disclosure is cheap and easy. This work adopts a different view. The 
assessment of shifts in consumer demand has neglected the substitution of 
those components subject to the warning labels and the impact of this re-
placement on the nutritional value of food, as well as the impact of people’s 
misperceptions of the labels on their diet and health. On a positive level, the 
 
 * Instructor of Economic Analysis of Law at the Stanford Department of Public Pol-
icy and John Olin Fellow in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School. LL.B. Law and So-
cial Sciences, Universidad de Chile Law School.  LL.M. Harvard Law School.  J.S.M., JSD 
(c) and M.A. (c) (Economics), Stanford University.  I thank Mitch Polinsky, Rob Mac-
Coun, Jacob Goldin, and Dan Ho for helpful conversations and feedback. 
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preceding effect casts doubt on what skeptical authors predict about disclo-
sure policies, who claim that people are inattentive and irresponsive to warn-
ing labels. However, on a normative level, the actual effects of this law are 
unclear or ambiguous. And given the prohibition to sell products with labels 
in preschools and schools, children are particularly vulnerable to the over-
looked consequences of this regulation. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Food is a main cause of pleasure. According to neurological studies, 
“[p]leasures of food, sex, addictive drugs, friends and loved ones, music, art, 
can produce strikingly similar patterns of brain activity.”1 Interestingly, ju-
risdictions are recurring to simplified warning labels that resemble either 
stop signs or traffic lights with the aim of nudging people towards healthier 
eating habits—i.e., discouraging people from eating some of the most ap-
pealing foods that have negative effects on their long-term welfare when 
consumed excessively. The main driver of this regulatory trend is the striking 
rise in obesity and overweight rates among population of all ages in both 
developed and developing countries. But why should the government ruin 
people’s pleasure with food warning labels? According to Cass Sunstein, 
calorie labels ruined popcorn.2 And the most cited law professor in the U.S. 
is not alone. In his podcast “Revisionist History,” Malcolm Gladwell nostal-
gically remembers the taste of the former MacDonald’s fries and criticizes 
the social movement that led MacDonald’s to depriving him of “those” fries, 
which made him “as happy as a puppy encountering snow.”3 Like Freddy 
Mercury, many people would sing “don’t stop me now.” They would do so 
in unison, and the song would be dedicated to the food labeling regulator.  
It is true that labels can impose a hedonic cost on the target of disclo-
sures. But there are important considerations that justify government regula-
tion. Informational failures, externalities, as well as time-inconsistent pref-
erences can support, from a cost-benefit perspective, the legitimacy of 
warning people of “unhealthy food” with special labels. The traditional food 
label addresses the first justification: provide people with information so that 
market forces drive inefficient, low-quality food out of the market. But sim-
plified labels rely on a behavioral premise: that attention and people’s ration-
ality is limited. Also, people tend to behave in ways that contradict their 
long-term goals. From this perspective, government guidance can help peo-
ple make better (and more consistent) choices.  
In fact, as Akerlof and Shiller put it, overweight and obesity can be 
considered as something “no one could possibly want.”4 The costs of obesity 
 
  1. Kent C. Berridge & Morten L. Kringelbach, Pleasure Systems in the Brain, 86 
NEURON 646, 649 (2015). 
  2. See Cass R. Sunstein, “They Ruined Popcorn”: On the Costs and Benefits of Man-
datory Labels (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No.18-06, 2017), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/abstract=3091789. 
  3. Abby Jackson, Why McDonald’s Fries Don’t Taste as Good as When You Were a 
Kid, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 2, 2017, 7:46 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/why-
mcdonalds-fries-taste-different-then-they-used-to-2017-11. 
  4. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: THE ECONOMICS 
OF MANIPULATION AND DECEPTION xv (2015). 
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and overweight are substantial, and the costs of disclosures are assumed to 
be negligible. For many, disclosure is cheap and easy. Thus, what could be 
better than simplified disclosures to help people eat better food? Yet, others 
believe this is not the right way to go. In fact, eminent academics believe that 
disclosure is futile for people who are usually irresponsive to the information 
presented to them. The Chilean experience falsifies that view—or, at least, 
shows that such a view is too simple. In fact, Chilean authorities report than 
more than 1,500 products have modified their composition to be offered to 
the Chilean market with fewer or no labels. Nonetheless, this work argues 
that those who commend the Chilean food labeling model base their assess-
ment on a myopic account of the net effects of this law. This is because the 
dynamic effect of the new labeling model on the nutritional value of food is 
unclear. 
This work is structured as follows: Section 1 provides the relevant back-
ground to understand the policy problems and objectives underlying food 
labeling. First, it notes the rise of the obesity epidemic and refers to the link 
between food quality and obesity. I also describe the NOVA classification 
of food, referring to sources that indicate that ultra-processed foods are the 
main drivers of non-communicable diseases. Section 1 ends with a discus-
sion of the aims and effectiveness of food labels. Section 2 describes the 
Chilean food labeling model in detail and examines the evidence available 




A. Obesity and Food Quality 
 
Obesity is a main concern around the world. Overweight and obesity 
are major risk factors for a number of chronic diseases, such as diabetes and 
cancer.5 While obesity was considered a problem only in high-income 
 
  5. WORLD HEALTH ORG., Obesity and overweight, http://www.who.int/mediacen-
tre/factsheets/fs311/en/ [hereinafter WHO Obesity and Overweight]; WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, at 2 (2004), http://apps.who.int/iris/bit-
stream/10665/43035/1/9241592222_eng.pdf?ua=1 [hereinafter WHO Global Strategy]; 
Emily J. Gallagher & Derek LeRoith, Epidemiology and Molecular Mechanisms Tying Obe-
sity, Diabetes, and the Metabolic Syndrome With Cancer, 36 DIABETES CARE S233, S234 
(2013); Obesity: Preventing and Managing the Global Epidemic, 894 WHO TECHNICAL REP. 
SERIES 1 (2000), https://www.who.int/nutrition/publications/obesity/WHO_TRS_894/en/. A 
study indicates overweight and obesity caused 3.4 million deaths, and 4% of years of life lost 
worldwide in 2010. See Marie Ng et al., Global, regional, and national prevalence of over-
weight and obesity in children and adults during 1980–2013: a systematic analysis for the 
Global Burden of Disease Study 2013, 384 LANCET 766, 767 (2014). Another study, account-
ing for differences in BMI, but focusing on the most severe type of obesity (Class III, i.e., 
BMI of 40 or higher), found that years of life lost ranged from 6.5 years for participants with 
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countries, overweight and obesity are now dramatically on the rise in low 
and middle-income countries, particularly in urban settings.6 The World 
Health Organization reports that “most of the world’s population live in 
countries where overweight and obesity kills more people than under-
weight.”7  
Worldwide obesity has nearly tripled since 1975.8 In the US, the Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics reports that in the period 2013-2014, 
37.9% of adults were obese; and 70.6% were overweight.9 According to 
country estimates for 2008, over 50% of both men and women in Europe 
were overweight, and roughly 23% of women and 20% of men were obese.10 
Overweight and obesity are the result of multifactorial elements: genetic, en-
vironmental, and behavioral. Yet, according to the World Health Organiza-
tion, most risk factors concerning morbidity and mortality are closely related 
to diet and physical activity.11 An important dietary factor leading to over-
weight and obesity is the increasing availability and consumption of ultra-
processed products.12 Many types of food processing are essential, benefi-
cial, or harmless.13 Since the discovery of fire, humans have processed food. 
During pre-industrialization times, food-processing was vital for the mainte-
nance of food.14 As Monteiro et al. put it, “[t]he processing of food has 
 
a BMI of 40-44.9 to 13.7 years for a BMI of 55-59.9. It also found that the number of years 
of life lost for Class III obesity was equal or higher than that of current cigarette smokers 
among normal-weight participants. See Andrew M. Prentice, The emerging epidemic of obe-
sity in developing countries, 35 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 93 (2006). The most prevalent causes 
of life-loss were heart failure, cancer, and diabetes. See WHO Global Strategy. 
  6. Prentice, supra note 5, at 95–96. 
  7. WHO Obesity and Overweight, supra note 5. 
 8. Id. 
  9. Cheryl D. Fryar, Margaret D. Carroll & Cynthia L. Ogden, Prevalence of Overweight, 
Obesity, and Extreme Obesity Among Adults Aged 20 and Over: United States, 1960–1962 
Through 2013–2014, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS (2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/obesity_adult_13_14/obesity_adult_13_14.pdf. 
  10. Data and statistics, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-top-
ics/noncommunicable-diseases/obesity/data-and-statistics (last visited Nov. 10, 2017).  
  11. Namely, this includes: high blood pressure, high concentrations of cholesterol in the 
blood, inadequate intake of fruit and vegetables, overweight or obesity, physical inactivity, 
and tobacco use. See WHO Global Strategy, supra note 5, at 2.  
  12. Carlos Augusto Monteiro et al., Increasing consumption of ultra-processed foods and 
likely impact on human health: evidence from Brazil, 14 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 5, 12 
(2010); Jean-Claude Moubarac et al., Consumption of ultra-processed foods and likely impact 
on human health. Evidence from Canada, 16 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 2240, 2241 (2013). 
  13. Carlos Augusto Monteiro et al., Ultra-processed products are becoming dominant in 
the global food system, 14 OBESITY REV. 21, 22 (2013). 
  14. Richard C. Hoffmann, Frontier Foods for Late Medieval Consumers: Culture, Econ-
omy, Ecology, 7 ENV’T & HIST. 131, 145 (2001) (referring to Medieval European demand for 
fish) (“[Q]uantities of 16 to 32 cm fish could be caught within sight of land but saving them 
to eat even a day or two later required their oily flesh to be kept from the air, smoked, or 
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enabled the evolution, adaptation and increase of humankind and of settled 
populations.”15  
However, food processing has changed with the development of indus-
trialization16 and some types of food processing being detrimental for human 
health. In this respect, there is a conventional taxonomy of food supplies and 
dietary patterns that distinguishes between kinds of processing: the NOVA 
food classification system.17 It facilitates the understanding of the signifi-
cance of food processing for human health, classifying food in four groups 
according to the nature, purpose, and extent of its processing.18 
i. Unprocessed foods are those that come from plants or animals and 
have not experienced any industrial processing. These foods are also 
referred to as “fresh” or “whole.” Minimally processed foods differ 
from unprocessed foods only in that they may involve the removal 
of parts of the food, without adding supplementary elements. Mini-
mal processing techniques extend the food’s duration and improve 
its flavor. 
 
ii. Processed culinary ingredients are extracted and refined from food 
components (such as fats, oils, and sugars) or obtained from nature 
(such as salt). These substances are not usually consumed by them-
selves. Their main purpose is to aid in the preparation and cooking 
of foods. 
 
iii. Processed foods are manufactured by adding fats, oils, sugars, salt, 
and other culinary ingredients to minimally processed and unpro-
cessed foods to make them more durable and improve their taste. 
 
iv. Ultra-processed food and drink products are inventions of modern 
industrial food science. “Most of these products contain little or no 
 
treated with salt.  Indeed, while the Germanic word harinc is said to derive from their army-
like masses, the Latin term bailee simply means salted fish.”). 
  15. Monteiro et al., supra note 13, at 21. 
 16. Id. 
 17. This method was first proposed by a team of investigators led by Prof. Carlos Mon-
teiro in 2009. It has been improved constantly building upon prior experiences. Today, it is 
recognized as a respectable classification and several organizations use it. See id. at 25–26; 
Carlos Augusto Monteiro et al., The UN Decade of Nutrition, the NOVA Food Classification 
and the Trouble with Ultra-Processing, 21 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 5, 10 (2018); Carlos Au-
gusto Monteiro et al., NOVA. The star shines bright, 7 WORLD NUTRITION 28, 30–34 (2016); 
Monteiro et al., supra note 12, at 6; Moubarac et al., supra note 12, at 2241. 
 18. I based this description from Monteiro et al., The UN Decade of Nutrition, the NOVA 
Food Classification and the Trouble with Ultra-Processing, supra note 17, at 11; Moubarac 
et al., supra note 12, at 2246. 
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whole food.”19 They are industrial preparations manufactured from 
substances derived from foods or synthesized from other organic 
sources. In Jean-Claude Moubarac’s words, “[t]he purpose of ultra-
processing is to create products that are convenient (durable, ready-
to-eat, -drink or -heat), attractive (hyperpalatable), and profitable 
(cheap ingredients). Their effect all over the world is to displace all 
other food groups. They are usually branded assertively, packaged 
attractively, and marketed intensively.”20 These products thrive in 
our diet and occupy most of the supermarkets’ aisles.21  
 
In the U.S., the economic effect of obesity has been estimated at a range 
between 2% and 6% of the national health expenditure.22 A systematic re-
view of several U.S. studies found that among the four highest quality anal-
yses, “the 2008 per-person direct medical cost of overweight was $266 and 
of obesity was $1,723. The aggregate national cost of overweight and obesity 
combined was $113.9 billion.”23 More recent meta-analyses provide similar 
estimates.24 Europe spends between 1.9% and 4.7% of the total annual health 
care costs and 2.8% of the annual hospital costs in dealing with overweight 
or obese patients.25 According to Michael Pollan,  “perhaps the food move-
ment’s strongest claim on public attention today is the fact that the American 
diet of highly processed food laced with added fats and sugars is responsible 
 
 19. PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORG., Ultra-processed Food and Drink Products in Latin 
America: Trends, Impact on Obesity, Policy Implications, at 5 (2015), 
http://iris.paho.org/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/7699/9789275118641_eng.pdf. 
 20. JEAN-CLAUDE MOUBARAC, ULTRA-PROCESSED FOODS IN CANADA: CONSUMPTION, 
IMPACT ON DIET QUALITY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 11 (2017).  
 21. To name a few examples, ultra-processed foods include: chips and many other types 
of fatty, salty, or sweet packaged snack products; ice-cream, chocolate, and candies; cookies, 
pastries, and cakes; sweetened breakfast cereals; energy bars; carbonated drinks and energy 
drinks; sugar-sweetened milk drinks, including fruit yogurt drinks; fruit and fruit nectar 
drinks. Moubarac et al., supra note 12, at 2242; Monteiro et al., supra note 12, at 8. 
 22. Anne M. Wolf, What is the Economic Case for Treating Obesity?, 6 OBESITY RES. 
2S, 6S (1998). Excess medical costs attributable to obesity have been found to equal or exceed 
those of smoking. See Roland Sturm, The Effects Of Obesity, Smoking, And Drinking On 
Medical Problems And Costs, 21 HEALTH AFF. 245, 248 (2002). 
 23. Adam Gilden Tsai, David F. Williamson & Henry A. Glick, Direct Medical Cost of 
Overweight and Obesity in the USA: A Quantitative Systematic Review, 12 OBESITY REV. 50, 
50 (2011). 
 24. David D. Kim & Anirban Basu, Estimating the Medical Care Costs of Obesity in the 
United States: Systematic Review, Meta-Analysis, and Empirical Analysis, 19 VALUE HEALTH 
602, 610 (2016) (“From the meta-analysis, the pooled estimate of annual medical costs at-
tributable to obesity was $1901 ($1239–$2582) in 2014 USD, accounting for $149.4 billion 
at the national level.”). 
 25. Sarah Cuschieri & Julian Mamo, Getting to grips with the obesity epidemic in Eu-
rope, 4 SAGE OPEN MED. 1, 2 (2016). 
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for the epidemic of chronic diseases that threatens to bankrupt the health care 
system.”26  
 
B. The Aims of Nutrition Labels 
 
Nutrition labels have had different aims throughout history. For in-
stance, nutrition labels in the U.S. after World War II focused primarily on 
preventing vitamin-deficiency diseases. But nowadays authorities aim pri-
marily at providing information on nutrition information to minimize the 
risks of consumers presenting chronic diseases—a risk that became noticea-
ble in the 1980s.27 In fact, nutrition labels provide consumers with a stand-
ardized nutritional account of what they eat and should help them make more 
informed decisions.  
Nutrition labels are a type of disclosure, and disclosures are usually 
seen as a tool for correcting informational failures.28 When we eat, we can 
see how products look and certainly appreciate their taste, but we rarely 
know what was used to produce them. Moreover, similar textures and tastes 
can be produced with different ingredients, some of which are cheaper to 
produce and less healthy than others. If similar tastes can be produced with 
diverse ingredients, and quality—in terms of health risks, for example—is 
positively correlated with cost, market forces will tend to produce low-
cost/low-quality products, as long as consumers may not appreciate quality 
easily.29 If producers are mandated to inform consumers of the ingredients 
they use, and consumers are well-informed—and educated—market forces 
will drive out those producers who supply food of inefficient low quality. In 
other words, consumers will price the health risks imposed by low-quality 
 
 26. Michael Pollan, The Food Movement, Rising, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 
(June 10, 2010), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2010/06/10/food-movement-rising/. 
 27. David A. Kessler et al., Developing the “Nutrition Facts” Food Label, 4 HARV. 
HEALTH POL’Y REV. 13, 14 (2003) (“Nutrition policy in the United States after World War II 
focused primarily on preventing vitamin-deficiency diseases. Over time, largely as a result of 
nutrient fortification programs, those ailments declined dramatically in this country, and re-
searchers increasingly turned their attention to the relationship between nutrition and chronic 
disease. New studies documented the role of diet in heart disease, cancer, obesity, and other 
chronic ailments, and in the 1980s, the Surgeon General and the Institute of Medicine pub-
lished pivotal reports on the subject.”).  
 28. Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alter-
natives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 556 (1979). 
 29. This is also referred to as a “lemons equilibrium.” See George A. Akerlof, The Market 
for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 490–92 
(1970); Howard Beales et al., The efficient regulation of consumer information, 24 J.L. ECON. 
491, 510 (1981). 
Upload 4 -Buyer Beware An Exploratory Assessment Model 4/15/2021  4:03 PM 
2021] Buyer Beware: An Exploratory Assessment 153 
food and will only buy this type of food when they derive net benefits from 
low-quality food.30  
Nevertheless, as Richard Craswell notes, disclosures may produce 
static and/or dynamic effects.31 The former intends to allow consumers to 
find the best alternative among a set of available products.32 The latter ex-
pects to change the current alternatives by providing sellers with incentives 
to modify the supply of the market.33 The Annual Percentage Rate (APR) is 
a good example of a static disclosure. By simplifying the annual cost of 
credit, consumers are able to choose the cheapest alternative.  
Another classification that distinguishes how the disclosure is intended 
to work, is Kahneman’s dual system taxonomy. 34  A disclosure may merely 
aim to educate the consumer rather than change behavior through incentives. 
Such a disclosure, targets people’s deliberative system (or System 2). But 
disclosures can also target people’s intuitive system (or System 1), which is 
fast and frugal, such as the case of graphic warnings some jurisdictions use 
for deterring tobacco consumption.35 Simplified nutrition labels usually have 
some sort of appeal to people’s intuitive system, in addition to summarizing 
information that consumers can corroborate in the larger and more detailed 
nutrition label. For instance, the British and Ecuadorian models resemble a 
traffic light. At first glance, a traffic light only informs potential buyers about 
the levels of ingredients subject to control. But people may well perceive that 
they should not “run a red light.”36 The informative message is that “red” is 
above the level predefined as healthy, but people are likely to perceive the 
message as a recommendation to “stop.” As I detail in the following section, 
this is the message conveyed by the Chilean labeling model. The warning 
labels precisely resemble a stop sign, but, unlike the British archetypal, the 
 
 30. Beales et al., supra note 29, at 492 (“Information about price, quality, and attributes 
allows buyers to make the best use of their budget by finding the product whose mix of price 
and quality they most prefer. In turn, buyers’ ability to locate preferred products gives sellers 
an incentive to compete to improve their offerings by allowing buyers to find and reward 
(with patronage) the seller whose offer they prefer. Without such information, the incentive 
to compete on price and quality will be weakened, and consumer welfare will be reduced.”). 
 31. Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to Judge Their 
Success or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 337–45 (2013). 
 32. Id. at 334 (“Static disclosures take a consumer’s existing range of choices as more or 
less given, and aim merely to improve a consumer’s choice from among the existing choice 
set.”).  
 33. Id. (“[D]ynamic disclosures seek to improve the existing choice set by creating in-
centives for sellers to improve the quality of their offerings.”). 
 34. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
 35. Cass R. Sunstein, People Prefer System 2 Nudges (Kind Of), 66 DUKE L.J. 121, 126, 
128 (2016). 
 36. I owe this point to my mentor Rob MacCoun, who raised this interpretation when 
providing feedback on a previous version of this article. 
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Chilean label is a binary model—a label is either present or not since there 
are no variations that may distinguish the unhealthy from the very unhealthy. 
The distinction between System 1 and System 2 disclosures is relevant 
for at least two reasons. The first one relates to the ethical criticisms that 
simplified labels can elicit. System 2 disclosures are unlikely to trigger ethi-
cal reproaches, but some consider System 1 disclosures as paternalistic.37 I 
will only refer to this issue tangentially in this article.38 The second reason 
relates to the mechanisms of influence on people’s behavior. System 2 dis-
closures target informational failures. If people do not know that what they 
are eating is unhealthy, then a nutrition label can help them find healthier 
food. Yet sometimes people can have an information overload because they 
may be required to process too many product-attributes, which strains our 
limited ability to process information.39 Accordingly, System 2 disclosures 
compensates for informational failures by facilitating comparison shopping 
and increasing competition via food labels that indicate the nutritional value 
of relevant product-attributes. If a significant number of consumers engage 
in comparison shopping and reward the producers who supply the most nu-
tritional food in the market, this is likely to produce significant shifts in food 
production.  
Other times, people face choices that are complex because consumers 
lack the proper knowledge to make an informed decision. For instance, many 
people find it difficult to comprehend compound-interest rates, and System 
2 disclosures, such as the APR and the Annual Percentage Yield (APY), fa-
cilitate people’s understanding of the terms they agree to when they buy a 
financial product.40 This is also the intent of simplified food labels, to facil-
itate people’s understanding of what they are eating. But it is important to 
bear in mind that in addition to the scientific knowledge that is hard to grasp 
for a large part of the population, the noisy signals sent by diverse scientific 
results about the impact of some elements used in food (e.g., dietary fat) on 
people’s health make people’s choices harder.41 In this sense, authority rec-
ommendations based on the best-available science can be particularly 
 
 37. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 126. For a discussion on the ethics of nudging, see Jeffrey 
J. Rachlinski, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Nudges, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1061 (2017) 
(book review). 
 38. For a strong defense of paternalism, see SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: 
JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM (2013). 
 39. George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on 
Our Capacity for Processing Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 92 (1956). 
 40. Ryan Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal Architecture of Disclosure Remains TBD, 113 
MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1027 (2015); Oren Bar-Gill, Defending (Smart) Disclosure: A Comment 
on More Than You Wanted to Know, 11 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 75, 76 (2015). 
 41. See, e.g., Gary Taubes, The Soft Science of Dietary Fat, 291 SCIENCE 2536, 2538–41 
(2001).  
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helpful, especially when non-scientific news circulate freely and rapidly on 
social media. As people can more easily compare the costs of credit with the 
help of simplified statistics, such as the APR, eaters may also be nudged 
towards healthier eating with the help of simplified labels. 
System 1 disclosures tackle people’s automatic system. As mentioned 
above, a clear example of a System 1 disclosure is a graphic warning inform-
ing the risks of smoking. Smokers usually underestimate the health risks of 
smoking because of optimism42 or present bias.43 And these biases that reside 
in our System 1 can be reduced by System 1 disclosures.44 For instance, 
Christine Jolls has shown how smoking warning labels reduce people’s mis-
conceptions about the risks of smoking.45 And overweight and obesity are 
likely to be explained by the same biases linked to smoking (i.e., optimism 
and present bias). In fact, despite the labels we find in our food, a large part 
of people who are overweight or obese prefer ultra-processed products. For 
low-income consumers, given current inequality levels and their implica-
tions for education, it may be particularly challenging to understand the in-
formation displayed by traditional nutrition labels. Furthermore, even if they 
understood the information and could appraise the relevant trade-offs, they 
may be forced to consume low-quality foods given possible budget con-
straints and inaccessibility to nutritional food.  
But many well-educated people who can afford healthier food consume 
junk food, aware of its impact on their health. People’s recurrent intention to 
eat chocolate today and fruit a week later is a typical example of present bias 
in behavioral economics. Our tendency to place excessive weight on imme-
diate gratification and insufficient attention on our future-selves is well-doc-
umented.46 Graphic warning can ameliorate this problem by helping people 




 42. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 807 (1980). 
 43. See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 
451–54 (1997). 
 44. See, e.g., Bubb, supra note 40, at 1030 (arguing that System 1 disclosures are more 
effective than System 2 disclosures).  
 45. Christine Jolls, Product Warnings, Debiasing, and Free Speech: The Case of To-
bacco Regulation, 169 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 53, 67 (2013). 
 46. See, e.g., Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AMER. 
ECON. REV. 103, 104 (1999); Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Present Bias: Lessons 
Learned and To Be Learned, 105 AMER. ECON. REV. 273, 274 (2015). 
 47. Cass R. Sunstein, On Mandatory Labeling, with Special Reference to Genetically 
Modified Foods, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1043, 1052 (2017). 
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C. The Effectiveness of Nutrition Labels 
 
What does the empirical evidence show about the effectiveness of nu-
trition labels? The results are mixed. In the U.S., some studies have found 
that calorie labeling has decreased Body Mass Index (BMI) levels.48 Other 
studies provide a more critical account but still show a modest drop in BMI 
levels. In an interesting study, Alan Mathios documented how producers of 
low-fat salad dressing voluntarily disclosed that their products were low-fat. 
However, mandatory disclosure led consumers to prefer dressings with 
lower-fat content, despite the fact that there was already a voluntary labeling 
system in place.49 Furthermore, consumers appear to be willing to pay a pre-
mium for products containing nutrition labels, when comparing them with 
similar alternatives that contain no nutritional information.50 Generally, con-
sumers report being more aware of nutrition facts thanks to nutrition labels 
and to make decisions considering the information provided by them.51 
However, there is also evidence casting doubt on the efficacy of nutri-
tion labels. For instance, a study found that people only rarely consulted nu-
trition information, and those who did found it challenging to understand the 
information conveyed.52 In a similar vein, a systematic review of 103 studies 
by Cowburn and Stockley noted that while some consumers do consult nu-
trition labels, they tend to find labels confusing—particularly, the technical 
and numerical information.53 More fundamentally, this review identified 
 
 48. See Partha Deb & Carmen Vargas, Who Benefits from Calorie Labeling? An Analysis 
of its Effects on Body Mass 1–29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21992, 
2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21992. 
 49. Alan D. Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices: 
An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651, 672 (2000)  (“Mandatory 
nutrition labeling appears to have had an impact on consumer food choices in the salad dress-
ing market. This occurs despite the fact that under voluntary labeling, firms had a credible, 
low-cost mechanism for disclosing this information. It is unlikely that the decline in sales 
identified in this study is the result of some other factor correlated with mandatory labeling.”). 
 50. Maria L. Loureiro, Azucena Gracia & Rodolfo M. Nayga, Do Consumers Value Nu-
tritional Labels?, 33 EUROPEAN REV. AGRIC. ECON. 249, 249 (2006) (“On average, the mean 
willingness to pay (WTP) for a box of cookies with a nutritional label is estimated to be about 
11 per cent above the price of the box of cookies without a nutritional label. Consistent with 
prior expectations, our results also indicate a difference between the WTP of individuals suf-
fering from diet-related health problems (estimated mean 13 per cent) and those who do not 
suffer any diet-related health problems (estimated mean 9 per cent).”). 
 51. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Discourse, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 647, 675 (2011). 
 52. Gary Jones & Miles Richardson, An Objective Examination of Consumer Perception 
of Nutrition Information Based on Healthiness Ratings and Eye Movements, 10 PUB. HEALTH 
NUTRITION 238, 238 (2007). 
 53. Gill Cowburn & Lynn Stockley, Consumer Understanding and Use of Nutrition La-
belling: A Systematic Review, 8 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 21, 23 (2005). 
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several studies that challenged the validity of consumers’ self-reported levels 
of nutrition information analysis. Those studies concluded that consumers 
may look at nutrition labels, but they seldom process their meaning. 
A lucid critic of nutrition labels—and of disclosure more generally54—
is Professor Omri Ben-Shahar. In a Forbes op-ed, Ben-Shahar described 
Michelle Obama’s efforts for updating the American nutrition label as fu-
tile.55 This was because, according to the author, the nutrition label does not 
have any impact on people’s behavior. In Ben-Shahar’s words, “The fight 
over the nutrition label is a story of great irony, because—notwithstanding 
the adoration it receives—in its twenty-five years of existence it has not af-
fected how people eat.”56 In addition to referring to some of the articles de-
scribed above, Ben-Shahar bases his critical view on a field experiment he 
conducted with Adam Chilton. They tested whether outside the lab people 
paid greater attention to privacy disclosures that resembled nutrition labels, 
asking participants to perform personally sensitive web-related tasks and 
warning them that much of their sensitive information was being collected 
and broadly shared. In the control group, participants saw the data collection 
warning in the usual legal format that contained thousands of words in small 
print. In the treatment group, participants saw a warning in the nutrition box 
style instead. Notably, there were no differences among the groups. Both 
shared the same amount of personal information.57 Professor Ben-Shahar 
claims that this study is generalizable to most disclosure settings.58  
In the next section, I show how Professor Ben-Shahar’s skepticism—as 
well as the external validity of his experiment—does not match with the ef-
fects the Chilean food labeling law triggered in different Chilean markets. 
Nonetheless, the scarce evidence currently available does not warrant partic-
ular enthusiasm about the net effects of this law. It is true, as Richard Cras-
well soundly states, that we should not expect 100% of consumers to change 
their behavior to conclude that disclosures are effective. Even low rates of 
 
 54. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO 
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014). 
 55. Omri Ben-Shahar, FDA Versus Michelle Obama: The Curious Battle Over the Nutri-
tion Label, FORBES (June 16, 2017, 9:14 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/omribensha-
har/2017/06/16/fda-versus-michelle-obama-the-curious-battle-over-the-nutrition-label/. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Adam Chilton, Simplification of Privacy Disclosures: An 
Experimental Test, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S41, S56–S57 (2016). But see Ian Ayres & Alan 
Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545 
(2014). 
 58. Id. at S43. Another interesting line of criticisms to disclosure regulation comes from 
its administrability. Professor Daniel Ho has documented how the Restaurant Hygiene Grad-
ing System has been less effective than intended because of the failure of the inspection sys-
tem. See Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 
122 YALE L.J. 574 (2012). 
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behavioral change may cause net benefits. This is, as usual, an empirical 
question.59 But it is one that requires us to clearly define a normative criterion 
to appraise the success or failure of disclosures.  
Generally, static disclosures will be effective as long as the net benefit 
of the information provided is greater than the expenses of the disclosure. If 
consumers overestimate the quality of the product (i’), a disclosure would be 
cost-effective as long as the change that the disclosure produces on people’s 
overestimation is lower than 0. Conversely, if consumers underestimate the 
quality of a product, a disclosure would be cost-effective as long as the 
change in the underestimation produced by the disclosure is greater than 0. 
From a dynamic perspective, a disclosure would be effective if it improved 
product quality.60 
 
III. The Chilean Experience 
 
A. General Background 
 
Chile has one of the highest obesity rates in Latin America. According 
to the Pan-American Health Organization, 23.2% of the Chilean population 
above 18 years old is obese, and more than 60% is overweight.61 Notably, 
more than 30% of children (under 8 years old) are obese. As Camila Corva-
lan explains, “[s]ince the 1980s, the typical Chilean diet changed from pre-
dominantly natural foods to being dominated by ultra-processed foods, 
which are higher in calories and sugar.”62 In an attempt to reduce overweight 
and obesity among the Chilean population, especially among children, Chile 
enacted the Law of Food Labeling and Advertising (Law 20.606) in June of 
2016, which took more than 10 years to be approved in Chilean Congress.63  
According to this new law, any foods or beverages exceeding a certain 
level of sugar, sodium, saturated fat, or calories must carry a warning label 
identifying the excess. These warning labels are in addition to the general 
nutritional information that follows the general Codex Alimentarius 
 
 59. Craswell, supra note 31, at 341. 
 60. Id. at 361.  
 61. Pan-American Health Org. Chile & World Health Org. [WHO], Obesidad, 
http://www.paho.org/chi/index.php?option=com_content&view=arti-
cle&id=179:obesidad&Itemid=1005. 
 62. Camila Corvalán, What the World Will Learn from Chile’s Bold Policy to Curb Obe-
sity, BLOOMBERG PHILANTHROPIES (May 15, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.org/blog/world-
will-learn-chiles-bold-policy-curb-obesity/. 
 63. Andrew Jacobs, In Sweeping War on Obesity, Chile Slays Tony the Tiger, N.Y.  TIMES 
(Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/07/health/obesity-chile-sugar-regula-
tions.html. 
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guidelines.64 Furthermore, products that contain warning labels (i) are pro-
hibited from using any licensed or brand character, toy or giveaway, or child-
targeted imagery (including characters like Tony the Tiger, and Kinder Sur-
prise); (ii) cannot be advertised on television or on websites aimed at chil-
dren under 14 years old; and (iii) cannot be sold at preschool and school 
venues.65 Figure 1 provides a visual example of the food warning labels 
found on Chilean products.  
 
Figure 1: Chilean Food Warning Labels 
 
B. The Impact of the New Food-labeling Law 
 
What we see in Chile after the new food labeling law was enacted defies 
the prediction raised by the skeptics on the potential impact of warning labels 
to people’s behavior. In fact, the warning labels had an important impact on 
different markets. Although, as is often the case with general regulations, the 
results are market specific. Moreover, these results are static as well as dy-
namic. For example, Nestlé reports lower sales of chocolates (between 10 
and 15%, depending on the product) in the semesters following the enact-
ment of the law.66 Certainly, one may question whether this will be a long-
lasting effect. To date, there is only one public study assessing the static ef-
fects of this regulation. Scapini and Vergara analyzed the sale of ten products 
 
 64. World Health Org. [WHO] & Food and Agric. Org. [FAO], Codex Alimentarius 
(Food Labelling) (5th ed. 2007), http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a1390e/a1390e00.htm. 
 65. For a slightly more detailed account, see Corvalán, supra note 63. I based my de-
scription and the examples on her work. 
 66. Jessica Marticorena, Nestlé y ley de etiquetado: “No ha modificado de manera radi-
cal los hábitos de consumo” [Nestlé and food labeling law: “It has not radically changed 
consumer habits”], LA TERCERA (Apr. 30, 2017, 11:17 AM), http://www.latercera.com/noti-
cia/nestle-ley-etiquetado-no-ha-modificado-manera-radical-los-habitos-consumo/. 
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before and after the new labeling law entered into force.67 Their results show 
a general decline in sales of products containing “stop-signs” six months af-
ter the products incorporated the warning signs. However, the authors also 
found that among their sample, products with one and three warning labels 
tended to have increased sales. This is counterintuitive. According to the au-
thors, those products may lack substitutes, or may benefit from a highly loyal 
demand.68 The confidentiality of the products subject to analysis in the study 
make it particularly difficult to put the study into context. 
A survey conducted by The University of Chile may help shed light in 
this regard. This university surveyed 1,067 adult people of different socio-
economic backgrounds. The survey results report that 93% of consumers 
recognize (i.e., know the meaning of) the warning labels, 44% say they com-
pare the number of warning signs when buying food and drinks, and almost 
70% of them (31% of the total sample) tend to choose products with fewer 
labels.  Almost 10% of them reported not buying products with warning la-
bels at all, and 14% reported buying less than they would have bought, had 
the products lacked the warning labels.69 Several media articles in which 
managers assess the impact of the new labeling law confirm those results.70 













 67. Valeria Scapini Sanchez & Cinthya Vergara Silva, El impacto de la nueva ley de 
etiquetados de alimentos en la venta de productos en Chile [The impact of the new food labe-
ling law on the sale of food products in Chile], 3 PERFILES ECONÓMICOS 7, 20 (2017). 
 68. Id. at 27. 
 69. MINISTERIO DE SALUD [MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF CHILE], INFORME DE EVALUACIÓN DE 
LA IMPLEMENTACIÓN DE LA LEY SOBRE COMPOSICIÓN NUTRICIONAL DE LOS ALIMENTOS Y SU 
PUBLICIDAD [EVALUATION REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOOD LABELING LAW AND 
ITS PUBLICITY] 83 (2017), https://www.minsal.cl/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Informe-Im-
plementación-Ley-20606-junio-2017-PDF.pdf. 
 70. See Marticorena, supra note 66; Angélica Baeza, Fanta y Sprite reducen su contenido 
de azúcar a la mitad y ya no tendrán sello [Fanta and Sprite reduce their sugar content by 
half and will no longer have nutritional labels], LA TERCERA (Sep. 27, 2017, 11:11 AM), 
http://www.latercera.com/noticia/fanta-sprite-reducen-contenido-azucar-la-mitad-ya-no-ten-
dran-sello/. 
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Figure 2: Stated Comparison of Warning Signs  
When Buying Food and Drinks 
 
 




With respect to the dynamic effects of this law, Chilean Authorities re-
port that one year after the enactment of the new labeling law more than 





Within those who report comparing labels, do warning 
labels influence your your buying behavior?
Yes, I choose food with fewer labels
Yes, I don’t buy food with labels
Yes, I buy less than what I would have bought if the product had no
warning labels





Do you compare the number of warning signs when you 
buy food?
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fewer warning labels.71 Numerous products—such as soda and deserts—re-
placed sugar with sweeteners. Today, the Chilean Government evaluates the 
impact on the health of such substitution.72 Furthermore, some producers not 
only modified their recipe, but also started advertising that their products 
came with no warning labels. For instance, Soprole, a company that special-
izes in milk and dessert products, widely advertises that “all Soprole desserts 
are free of labels.”73 Turkey and sausage producers also advertise in the same 
way.74  
Notably, Coca-Cola reduced the sugar content of Fanta and Sprite by at 
least 50%. This case is remarkable. Today, the regular version of these drinks 
contains little less than half of the sugar content of a regular Pepsi (9.6g per 
200ml vs. 22g per 200 ml, respectively).75 This is despite the fact Coca-Cola 
and Pepsi Co. also offer “zero” versions of these carbonated drinks, which 
come with no sugar at all. Coca-Coca claims the reduction in sugar content 
did not affect the taste of Fanta and Sprite. Coca-Cola achieved this effect 
by replacing sugar with sucralose and acesulfame.76 According to current 
science, there is growing evidence that both sucralose and acesulfame could 
 
 71. Juan Pablo Sallaberry & Sebastián Labrín, Minsal indaga aumento en uso de edulco-
rantes debido a Ley de Etiquetado [Ministry of Health investigates increase in the use of 
sweeteners due to the Food Labeling Law], LA TERCERA (May 22, 2017, 12:58 AM), 
http://www.latercera.com/noticia/minsal-indaga-aumento-uso-edulcorantes-debido-ley-eti-
quetado/. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Macarena Fernández, Así se están transformando las empresas de alimentos para 
eliminar los sellos negros [This is how food companies are evolving to eliminate the black 
food labels], EL DEFINIDO (Jan. 20, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.eldefinido.cl/actuali-
dad/pais/8013/Asi-se-estan-transformando-las-empresas-de-alimentos-para-eliminar-los-se-
llos-negros/. 
 74. Agrosuper, a major player in the Chilean food sector, reports that they reduced so-
dium and fat content of 73 products one month before the new food labeling law entered into 
force. See Presentation, Presentación Agrosuper noviembre 2017 [Agrosuper Presentation 
November 2017] (2017), https://www.agrosuper.cl/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/10/Presentación-Agrosuper-3T17-Version-Final.pdf. The firm appears to have 
strategically reduced sodium and fat before the enactment of the law, in order to start adver-
tising when the warning labels benefited from high media exposure.  
 75. Nutritional Information of Fanta, FATSECRET (May 2, 2018, 1:52 AM), 
https://www.fatsecret.cl/calorías-nutrición/fanta/fanta/1-vaso; Nutritional Information of 
Sprite, FATSECRET (Dec. 10, 2018, 6:06 AM), https://www.fatsecret.cl/calorías-nu-
trición/sprite/bebida/100ml; Nutritional Information of Pepsi, FATSECRET (May 7, 2020, 
12:54 AM), https://www.fatsecret.cl/calorías-nutrición/pepsi/pepsi/1-vaso; see also Baeza, 
supra note 70. 
 76. Igual de ricas y… ¡sin sellos!, COCA COLA JOURNEY CHILE, https://www.cocacolade-
chile.cl/historias/bienestar-igual-de-ricas-sin-sellos (last visited Apr. 7, 2019). 
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pose risks to human health.77 But there is yet to be a scientific consensus on 
this issue.78 
One of the most salient public policy concerns that supported the ap-
proval of the new labeling law was child obesity. As described above, this 
regulation did not only mandate warning labels for products exceeding cer-
tain levels of calories, sugars, saturated fats, and sodium (per 100 mg). It also 
restricted the advertisement and distribution channels of those products. Re-
stricted advertising as well as restricted distribution are certainly variables 
one may consider as confounding in interpreting the reported reduced sales.  
Reduced sales are likely to incentivize perverse dynamic effects. It may 
be true that children ate too much chocolate or perhaps bought Kinder Sur-
prise hoping to get a new toy to play with in a break. Chips and Cheetos taste 
great, despite their high content of calories, saturated fats, and sodium. Most 
educated parents would generally probably prefer their children to stay away 
from too much chocolate and junk food. However, according to food pro-
ducers, practically any brownie containing honey must include a warning 
label with current standards. And the same happens with products containing 
oatmeal, a highly caloric ingredient—but rich in fiber, protein, important vit-
amins, minerals, and antioxidants—whose use almost automatically triggers 
a warning label.79 
To my understanding, the dynamic effect on the nutritional value of 
food, which is especially important for children, has been totally neglected 
in the assessment of Chile’s new labeling law. The dynamic effect on chil-
dren should have been a main concern in the design of the regulation—espe-
cially considering that children can only buy food with no labels at school. 
We would like children to avoid the consumption of ultra-processed food, 
but it is egregious to put whole (or minimally processed) foods, which are 
rich in key nutrients for the children’s proper physical development, in the 
 
 77. Hilary Brueck, There’s even more evidence that artificial sweeteners like aspartame 
could be dangerous, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 2, 2018, 6:15 AM), https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/artificial-sweeteners-aspartame-and-sucralose-damage-gut-bacteria-e-coli-
2018-10; Christopher Gardner et al., Nonnutritive Sweeteners: Current Use and Health Per-
spectives: A Scientific Statement from the American Heart Association and the American Di-
abetes Association, 35 DIABETES CARE 1798, 1806 (2012) (“[T]here are insufficient data to 
determine conclusively whether the use of NNS [Nonnutritive Sweeteners] to displace caloric 
sweeteners in beverages and foods reduces added sugars or carbohydrate intakes, or benefits 
appetite, energy balance, body weight, or cardiometabolic risk factors.”). 
 78. Compare Bernadene A. Magnuson et al., Critical review of the current literature on 
the safety of sucralose, 106 FOOD & CHEMICAL TOXICOLOGY 324, 325 (2017) (finding that 
data support the conclusion that sucralose is safe for consumption), with Gardner et al., supra 
note 77, at 1806 (finding that data are inconclusive with regard to the effects of sucralose on 
health). 
 79. I heard this from industry actors in confidential interviews I conducted in Chile and 
confirmed it with fatsecret.cl. 
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same basket with ultra-processed foods. Yet this is what the Chilean labeling 
law did. In the eyes of Chilean law, an oatmeal cookie is as unhealthy as 
Cheetos. 
Another criticism that has been raised in Chile is that the warning labels 
frightens consumers rather than educate them.80 This is certainly an empirical 
question that merits further study, but I depart my analysis bearing in mind 
that warning labels are System 1 disclosures, which can also act as System 2 
disclosures. Warning labels appeal to people’s automatic system to a lesser 
degree than graphic labels, such as those found in Chilean cigarette pack-
ages. We know that smoking is addictive and contributes to cancer. This is 
why System 1 disclosures aimed at discouraging smoking count on wide-
spread support.81 Additionally, such a strong disclosure model seems to be 
effective.82 If we know that ultra-processed food is a main cause of obesity 
and overweight—which in turn contribute to cancer, diabetes and other seri-
ous diseases—it seems paradoxical to have divergent views about the legiti-
macy of the warning labels. 
Nonetheless, it is worth asking how educative or informative these sim-
plified food labels can be. For instance, according to the University of 
Chile’s survey, 47% of respondents considered products free of labels as 
“healthy.” Notably, five percent of participants opined that products without 
labels “helped to lose weight.” Of course, this makes sense under the as-
sumption that people decrease their caloric intake—keeping everything else 
constant. However, studies indicate that people may draw false inferences 
from similar signals, which might ultimately increase overweight levels. For 
instance, “low-fat” labels may increase food intake by distorting the eaters’ 
perceptions of the appropriate serving size as well as decreasing consump-
tion guilt.83 Almost a quarter of participants in a study catalogued products 
free of warning labels as made of “better quality than those that have warning 
labels.” But are consumers really trading-off the lower calorie, sodium, fat, 
 
 80. Marticorena, supra note 66. 
 81. Graphic warnings on warnings on tobacco packaging are required under the WHO’s 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which, as of February 2009, had been ratified 
by 168 countries. See World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Con-
trol, art. 11, ¶ 1(b) (2003). 
 82. See, e.g., Victoria White, Bernice Webster & Melanie Wakefield, Do graphic health 
warning labels have an impact on adolescents’ smoking-related beliefs and behaviours?, 103 
ADDICTION 1562, 1568 (2008) (claiming that graphic warnings can be effective at reducing 
smoking among adolescents and reviewing the relevant literature). 
 83. Brian Wansink & Pierre Chandon, Can “Low-Fat” Nutrition Labels Lead to Obe-
sity?, 43 J. MARKETING RES. 605, 605 (2006) (“[L]ow-fat nutrition labels increase food intake 
by (1) increasing perceptions of the appropriate serving size and (2) decreasing consumption 
guilt.”). 
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and sugar levels against the nutritional value of what they and their children 
eat? 
At least two crucial points are worth mentioning in this respect. First, 
the Chilean model is quite limited in providing information given its binary 
nature. Unlike the British and Ecuadorian models, which consider three cat-
egories resembling a traffic-light, the Chilean archetype is a “black-or-
white” or “all-or-nothing” alternative. Even if products only slightly exceed 
sugar threshold, they carry the same warning label as those that contain five 
times the threshold of sugar content. In this respect, the traffic-light model 
appears to be more informative. However, there might be a trade-off between 
the warning label’s impact on consumer choice given its simplicity—facili-
tating comparison shopping—and a more informative traffic-light that might 
cause a lesser impact on people’s System 1. This is also an empirical ques-
tion; future research may do well in evaluating whether this trade-off is real. 
To the more-educated consumers, warning labels can make compari-
son-shopping easier. But it is also reasonable to hypothesize that labels can 
create some sort of stigma that high-income people would prefer to avoid—
e.g., if people perceived that labels identified low-quality food, or that con-
sumers of products with labels did not take care of themselves and of their 
significant others. And if enough people started avoiding the labels, or if 
food producers expected people to avoid the warning labels, we would see 
dynamic effects, even ex-ante. This is probably what Coca-Cola predicted. 
And it is hard to imagine companies with better information about consum-
ers’ tastes than those industry giants. 
Nevertheless, given the dynamic effects I have referred to, it should be 
clear that many times the warning label system does not act as a “nudge.” A 
nudge is a minimally invasive regulatory strategy that aims at steering people 
towards a certain direction, allowing them to go their own way.84 This type 
of regulatory tool is conceived as a type of libertarian paternalistic interven-
tion precisely because people have the chance of choosing—or acting, more 
generally—in a different way to the behavior the regulator expected to 
elicit.85 But the dynamic effects we see can hardly be interpreted as mini-
mally invasive. Many people just lost the food they liked. And, in some 
cases, it is possible that the food they liked was more nutritious than what 
market forces supplied in response to the food label. The net effects of this 
trend are hard to measure.86 But, as Malcom Gladwell lost his favorite fries 
in the 90s as a consequence of the higher political salience and the health 
 
 84. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008). 
 85. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxy-
moron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2003). 
 86. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2. 
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risk those fries posed, many people lost the food they liked as a consequence 




The new Chilean labeling law project took more than 10 years to be 
approved in Congress. Its main supporter, Guido Guirardi, a surgeon by 
training, once protested a presidential veto against this project outside the 
presidential palace claiming that “[s]ugar kills more people than terrorism 
and car accidents combined,” as he shook a box of Trix cereal for effect and 
stated: “It’s the poison of our time.”87 Guirardi and his allies probably had 
noble intentions in seeking to have this law passed. As a doctor, he certainly 
understood that ultra-processed food is linked to several types of cancer, di-
abetes, as well as other non-communicable diseases. And children are par-
ticularly vulnerable to ultra-processed food, since it looks more attractive 
than healthier alternatives and is marketed assertively.  
Food warning labels appear to be a good way to combat low-quality 
food. After all, more information is assumed to be better, especially if it 
makes decisions easier. Besides, warning labels seem to be effective at re-
ducing smoking, and the informational and behavioral problems that lead 
some people to smoke are likely to work in a similar way in the case of ultra-
processed food. So far, other Latin American countries such as Ecuador and 
Brazil are contemplating following Chile’s regulatory model.88 Some believe 
these efforts would be futile because nutrition labels, either long or short, 
have no influence on people’s behavior. The Chilean experience defies this 
view—or, at least, shows that such a view is too simplistic. In fact, Chilean 
authorities report that more than 1,500 products have been modified to be 
offered with no or fewer labels.  
Nonetheless, this work argues that those who commend the Chilean 
food labeling model base their assessment on a myopic account of the net 
effects of this law. I claim this is because the dynamic effect of the new la-
beling model on the nutritional value of food is unclear, as Richard Craswell 
concluded in an important paper on disclosure by cautioning that:  
[P]eople who expect disclosure laws to solve almost every prob-
lem—quickly, easily, and with very little cost—are doomed to 
have their expectations crushed. The truth is that a successful dis-
closure law, like any other form of regulation, requires lots of dif-
ficult work, including a careful specification of the purposes the 
disclosure might serve, and careful assessment of all the various 
 
 87. Jacobs, supra note 63. 
 88. Id.  
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effects (both good and bad) that most disclosures produce. As a 
result, those who expect disclosures to succeed easily will usually 
be doomed to disappointment. They may feel that they have been 
“basely swindled,” and they may even be tempted to do away with 
disclosure laws entirely.89  
 
A well-designed simplified disclosure system may have boosted com-
petition to get rid of the labels, and consumers may certainly benefit when 
food producers provided healthier alternatives. But we do not know with if 
this is happening in Chile. Further research is necessary to appraise this dy-
namic effect triggered by the new food labeling law. If food quality is worse 
now due to the use of chemically modified ingredients as substitutes for nat-
ural occurring ones, the regulator may face the difficult task of either includ-
ing further warning labels, such as “high in sucralose or acesulfame,” or ban-
ning the use of unsafe ingredients in the future. The regulation of food quality 
is a difficult problem and general disclosures are unlikely to solve it quickly, 
easily, and with very little cost.  
 
 89. Craswell, supra note 31, at 379. 
